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Case Comment

GRAFSTEiN v. HOLME AND FREEMAN - PERSONAL PROPERTY - DE
FACTO POSSESSION - DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PLACE RIGHTS OF FENDER VERSUS TRUE OWNER - The recent

Court of Appeal decision in Grafstein v. Holme and FreemanI
is the first reported Ontario case to deal with the problem of the
right to lost property where there are conflicting claims between
the finder of the lost property, and the owner or occupier of the place
wherein the property was found.2 In the case of Bird v. The Town of
Fort Frances3 an earlier Ontario decision, the issue involved was
whether a trespasser who took the lost money from the land of
another, was entitled to it as against the Town.4 In the Grafsteincase,
the claim was between the finder of money and the owner of the
premises on which the money was found, a fact situation similar to
that in the leading case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth.5
The appellant Holme began working -in the respondent's dry
goods store on September 23, 1953. On the same day, while cleaning
up the basement, which was one of Ilolme's duties, he came across a
padlocked metal box covered with rubbish. He took the box to
Grafstein, who told him to put it on a shelf and leave it there. Holme
did as he was told and Grafstein denied ownership of the box suggesting that it probably contained carpenter's tools, since substantial
alterations had been made to the store in the previous year. Grafstein
claimed to have known the box was there since 1951, but the trial
judge accepted Holme's statement that he found it under a pile of
rubbish and had taken it to Grafstein.
The appellant, Freeman, started to work in Grafstein's store
in the spring of 1955 and seemed to know of the box at that time.
On December 31st, 1955, when the two employees were putting away
Christmas decorations, their curiosity got the better of them and
they sawed the lock off the box. To their surprise, they found
approximately $38,000.00 in neat bundles. They bought a new lock
and replaced the box on the shelf. After the store closed, the
appellants told Grafstein of their find and suggested they divide the
money equally among themselves. Grafstein thought it better, "to
leave it 'the way it is", and after supper they all returned to the store
where Grafstein's lawyer was present. The lawyer turned the money
over to the police on the understanding that if the true owner was
not found, the money was to be returned. When the true owner
could not be found, the police turned the money over to the Public
Trustee who was ordered to pay the money into court. In an interpleader action, it was decided that Grafstein was entitled to the

money, and Holme and Freeman appealed that decision.
21 [1958]

O.R. 296. The trial judgment is reported in [1957] O.R. 354.
See generally, Three Cases on Possession (1929), 3 Camb. L.J. 195;
Todd (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 962; Sommerfield (1958), 36 Can. Bar Rev. 558.
3 [1949] O.R. 292..
4 See Todd, ante footnote 2, where the Gfrafstein and Bird cases are
compared.
5 [1852] 21 L.J.Q.B. 75; 15 Jun. 1079.
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The trial judge felt that the money was not "lost" since it was
carefully sorted into packages and placed in the box. He attempted
to create an intermediate classification between "lost"and "not lost"
property. This distinction seems to be similar to the doctrine of
"misplaced" property which has been applied in the United States. 6
Fortunately, the Court of Appeal found the box to be "lost"7 and
thus averted the introduction of an intermediate classification into
the law of Ontario.
The appellate Court also considered whether possession of the
box gave possession of the money as well. There is no clear law
on the subject,8 but the court felt that there was a rebuttable presumption that a person who had possession of the receptacle also
had possession of the contents. 9 The judgment does not tell us
whether this presumption was applied, but since the Court of Appeal
decided the case on the question of who had possession of the box
at the time of the finding of the money and not at the time of the
finding of the box, it would appear that the presumption was not
applied.
Although it is often said that when a servant finds a lost article
in the course of his employment, he finds it for his master,10the writer
can find only one case in which the decision was clearly based on this
proposition. In McDowell v. Bank of Ulster", the bank succeeded
against its caretaker in recovering £25 which he found, and the court
gave judgment on the ,basis of the master-servant relationship. In
the Grafstein case, Lebel J.A. hints that a claim based on a masterservant relation would not succeed.12
In discussing the judgment of Lord Russell of Killowen in the
Sharman case, LeBel J.A.'3 points out that the principle of that case
was based on the statements of Pollock and Wright.' 4
'The possession of land carries with it in general, by our law, possession
of everything which is attached to or under that land, and in the absence
of a better title elsewhere, the right to possess it also."

The Ontario Court of Appeal seemed to accept this statement.
LeBel J.A. discussing the Sharman case points out that Lord
Russell extended the original statement by Pollock and Wright:
"... . but the general principle seems to me to be that where a person has
possession of a house or land, with a manifest intention to exercise
6 See Brown, Personal Property (1936), 3rd ed., at p. 25 for a good
discussion of the doctrine of misplaced property and Heddle v. Banlk of
Hamilton, [1912] 5 D.L.R. 11, where the doctrine was applied in a British
Columbia case.
7 Ante footnote 1 at p. 302.
8 See generally Paton, Bailment In the Common Law (1952), at p. 120
and Meny v. Green, [1841] 7 M. W. 623; 151 E.R. 916.
9 Ante footnote 1 at p. 306.
10 See Todd, ante footnote 2 and Brown, ante footnote 6. See also Hannah
v. Peel, [1945] K.B. 509 at p. 519 where Birkett J. feels that this is a sufficient
explanation of the South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, [1896] 2 Q.B.
44 case, even though it is not the ratio.
11 [1899] 33 Ir. L.T. 225.
12 [1958] O.R. 296 at p. 311.
13 Ibid., at p. 305.
14 Pollock and Wright, Possession in the Common Law (1888), at p. 41.
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control over it and the things which may be upon or in it, then if some
thing is found on that land, whether by an employee of the owner, or
by a stranger,1 5the presumption is that that thing is in the owner of the
locus in quo."
Mr. Justice LeBel says:
"...
I do not think anyone could seriously quarrel with the principle...
so long as it is established in evidence as a basis for the presumption
that the occupier has in fact the possession of the house or land with
manifest intention to exercise control over it (i.e. the land or the house)
and the things which may be upon or in it . . . there must then be a
natural presumption of possession in favour of the person in occupation . .. "16

After stating the presumption and the rebuttals made by the appellants, it appears that the court did not use this presumption as a basis

for giving judgment.

Is it necessary to bring the presumption

("natural" or otherwise) into our law? The decision in this case gives

us principles (which will be shown) on which to decide a dispute of
this kind and, the facts of an individual case will determine the claim

on the basis of these principles without the necessity of introducing
such a presumption.
The appeal court attempted to discover the true basis of the
decision in the leading case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth.1 7

In that

case, the plaintiff picked up a package containing bank notes which
had accidently been dropped on the floor of the defendant's store. The
plaintiff handed the notes over to the owner of the store to find the

true owner. After advertising unsuccessfully for the true owner, the
plaintiff demanded the notes and the shopkeeper refused.
Patterson J. said:
The notes never were in the custody of the defendant, nor within the
protection of his house, before they were found . . . and the defendant
has come under no responsibility except from the communication made
to him by the plaintiff, the finder.. 18

Consequently, the plaintiff got the money as against all persons except the real owner. The Ontario Court of Appeal correctly pinpointed
the ratio of the judgment (which eluded Lord Russell in the Sharman

case) by saying:
* . . the shopkeeper had not the custody and owed no duty to the real
owner...

Surprisingly the court continues:
. . . because no one had communicated to him the fact that the parcel
of bank notes was on the floor of the shop. If this is the gist of the
ratio as I think it is . . . the occupier's ignorance of the existence of the
lost article distinguishes Bridges v. Hawkesworth and Hannah v. Peel,
which followed it, from the Sharman case, the Elwes v. Brigg case, and
Beg. v. Rowe19
It is difficult to see how communication or lack of communication to
the occupier of land, regarding the lost article, can be the distinction
15 [18961 2 Q.B. 44 at p. 47.
16 Ante footnote 12 at p. 305.
17 Ante footnote 5.
18 Ibid., at p. 1082.
19 Ante footnote1 at pp. 307-308.
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between the cases mentioned, since in all of these cases the occupiers
never knew of the existence of the lost article until it was found. In
Bridges v. Hawkeswortk, the owner of the store did not know of the
lost money until the finder brought it to him. In Hannah v. Peel20
the owner of the requisitioned house knew nothing of the valuable
broach until the authorities notified him that a soldier had found it
in a window casement. Also in the Sharman case, the owners of the
pool knew of no rings until their employees found them. In Elwes v.
Brigg Gas Company,2 1 the owner of the land did not know of the prehistoric boat until the tenant dug it up. Similarly, in Beg. v. Rowe,22
the canal company did not know about the stolen iron until the police
found the accused. However, although communication to the occupier
of land does not seem to be the ratio of Bridges v. Hawkesworth, nor
the distinguishing feature between the other cases, communication
will be a factor in determining who has custody of the lost article.
The court applied the ratio in Bridges v. Hawkesworth in coming
to their decision:
(1) ... it must be concluded that the respondent had de facto possession
or custody of both the box and contents on2331st December, 1955, the
date the appellants made their discovery...

and
(2) .

.

. I am satisfied that he under took its custody and assumed the

legal responsibility of a finder...

24

Then why did the result differ from Bridges v. Hawkesworth? In
that case, the court applied the above principles to the time when
the package was found and seemed to ask whether the shopkeeper had
custody of the package and owed a duty to the true owner at the time
the finder picked the package up. .In the Grafstein case, the court
seemed to ask these questions at the time the box was broken into
and the money discovered, a date two years after the box was first
discovered by Holmes. It appears that Grafstein did not have custody
of the box nor did he owe a duty to the true owner until Holme followed Grafstein's instructions and put the box on the shelf. The court
never explains why it did not consider applying these principles to the
time Holme first found the box.25 The time at which the court applied
the principles determined the result of the case, but why did the court
apply the principles to the time the money was discovered and not to
the time when the box was first found?
The Ontario Court of Appeal has stated; (1) that things found
in or attached to land are in the possession of the occupier or owner
[1945) K.B. 509.
(1886), 33 Ch. D. 562.
(1859), Bell C.C. 93; 169 E.R. 1180.
[1958] O.1. 296 at p. 311. Here the Court equates "custody" (from
Bridge v. Haweswortk) and de facto possession (from Pollock and Wright).
In the writers opinion, Professor Goodheart would take exception to this because de facto possession is not found in the judgment of the Hawkesworl
case.24
Ibid., at p. 309.
25 Possession of the box would give possession of the contents.
20
21
22
23
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of the land, (2) that when things are found on land with a manifest
intention to control, then there is a presumption that the occupier has
possession of the article, but that this presumption may be rebutted.
In the Grafstein case we were not concerned with things attached
to land and we were never told whether the presumption was applied.
Grafstein received the money because at the time the money (not the
box) was discovered, he had de facto possession since Holme turned
the box over to him two years earlier and Grafstein was under a legal
obligation to the true owner. When dealing with a claim for lost property found on land, perhaps the fact that one party is the occupier
of land is not as important as it was before. Grafstein v. Holme &
Freeman indicates that custody of the article and an obligation to the
true owner are the tests and the mere occupation of the land on which
the article was found may only be a factor to be considered with other
facts in determining who had custody of the article.
GERALD J. MORRIS
UNITED MOTORS SERVICE INC. v. HUTSON ET AL.-LANDLORD AND TENANT-NEGLIGENCE-LESSOR'S OBLIGATION TO INSURE-LESSEE'S Li-

BiLITY-LESSOR'S RIGHTS-The decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in United Motor Service Inc. v. Hutson et al.1 has recently
gained attention as a result of the Ontario decision in Shell Oil Co. of
CanadaLtd. v. The White Motor Co. Ltd.2 Before analysing the problems posed by this judgment, it is intended to summarise the law on
the subject down to the instant case.
At common law, lessees for years were not liable for accidental
or negligent burning of demised premises. The Statutes of Marlebridge and Gloucester, however, rendered tenants liable for waste. In
Yellowly v. Gower,3 it was held that the liability included permissive
as well as voluntary waste. The Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act, R.S.O. 1927, c. 137 stated in section 31: Lessees making or suffering waste in the demised premises without licence of the lessors shall
be liable for the full damage so occasioned.
In the Accidental Fires Act, R.S.O. 1927, c. 146, the following
provision is to be noted: No action shall be brought against any person in whose house or building or on whose land any fire shall accidentally begin, nor shall any recompense be made by him for any
damage suffered thereby; but no contract or agreement made between
landlord and tenant shall be hereby defeated or made void. This
statute is based on 6 Anne, c. 131 and 14 Geo. III c. 78. It was
decided in 1847 in Filliterv. Phippard4 that the exemption "fire shall
accidentally begin" did not include a fire caused by the tenant's negligence. This decision has never been doubted in Britain or Canada,
* Mr. Morris is presently enrolled in the second year at Osgoode Hall Law
School.
1 [19371 S.C.R. 294.

2 [1957] O.W.N. 229.
3 (1855), 11 Ex. 274.
4 (1847), 11 Q.B. 347.

